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1.

INTRODUCTION

The service-oriented infrastructure has become popular for collaboratively mining data distributed over organizations [3], where
the participants are the data providers who submit their perturbed
datasets to the designated data mining service provider (the data
miner) for mining commonly interested models. Figure 1 shows
the service-oriented framework for collaborative multiparty data
mining. Two kinds of parties are directly involved in the computing. The mining service provider (SP) is a party independent of the
data providers, which owns abundant computing power, data mining tools and talents. SP offers their data mining services to the
contracted parties through certain service provision scheme. We
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Service-oriented Figure 2: Optimized perturbamultiparty privacy preserving tion gives higher privacy guardata mining.
antee on average.
assume a semi-honest model for all parties. Therefore, we do not
consider the scenarios where either the data miner or some data
providers are malicious and can collude with one another. We also
assume that encryption is applied before data is transmitted on the
network. In this paper, we will study the problem of privacy preserving multiparty collaborative data classification using geometric
data perturbation.
Geometric data perturbation has unique benefits for privacy preserving data classification [1, 2]. First, many popular classifiers,
such as linear classifiers and Support Vector Machine (SVM), are
invariant to geometric transformation in the sense that the classifiers trained with the perturbed data through geometric rotations
have almost the same accuracy as those trained with the original
raw data. Second, geometric data perturbation can easily produce
multiple random transformations, each of which preserves classification model accuracy for the discussed classifiers. Thus, an inCopyright is held by the author/owner(s).
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dividual data provider needs only to select one perturbation that
can provide satisfactory privacy guarantee. A randomized perturbation optimization algorithm is also developed in previous work
[2] to provide high privacy guarantee with high probability (Figure
2). Comparing with other existing approaches to privacy preserving classification, geometric data perturbation significantly reduces
the complexity in balancing data utility and data privacy guarantee.
The key challenge for applying geometric data perturbation to
multiparty collaborative data classification is to unify the perturbations used by different data providers without sacrificing much
data privacy and data utility. In this paper, We develop the Space
Adaptation Protocol (SAP) for securely unifying the perturbations.
SAP enables parties to anonymously submit the perturbed data and
minimizes the risk of privacy breach with low cost.

2.

GEOMETRIC DATA PERTURBATION

We define a geometric perturbation as a combination of random
rotation perturbation, random translation perturbation, and noise
addition. It can be represented as G(X) = RX + Ψ + ∆. X denotes the normalized original dataset with N rows and d columns,
R is a d × d random orthogonal matrix, and Ψ is a d × N random
translation matrix [2]. Ψ = t × 10 and t is randomly generated
using the uniform distribution over [-1, 1]. ∆ is a noise matrix with
i.i.d. (independent identically distributed) elements, which is used
to perturb distances.
In papers [1, 2], we defined two privacy metrics for multi-column
privacy evaluation. In this paper we by default use the “Minimum
Privacy Guarantee” to represent the privacy guarantee of DPi , denoted by ρi . ρi is greater than or equal to zero and is bounded by
some value, say bi , which may be different for different datasets.
With the optimization algorithm [2], we can get a higher local
privacy guarantee ρi compared to the randomly generated perturbation as Figure 2 illustrates. Let the mean of optimized privacy guarantee be ρ̄i . We use the optimality rate O to represent the efficiency
of optimization for the particular dataset: Oi = ρ̄bii . The bound bi
is usually estimated empirically by looking at the maximum privacy guarantee of n-round optimizations, i.e., b̂ = max{ρ(i) , 1 ≤
i ≤ n}.
The evaluation of multiparty privacy guarantee is thus defined by
two aspects: the risk of data source being identified (source identifiability) and the reduction of local privacy guarantee by using
unified perturbation. We define the source identifiability πi as the
probability that the received data is indeed from the data provider
DPi , denoted by πi = P r(DPi |Xi ). Next, let the locally optimized perturbation give the privacy guarantee of ρi for DPi , and
the global perturbation G gives the privacy guarantee ρG
i . We define the satisfaction level for the unified perturbation G by the data
ρG

provider DPi as si = ρii . Let bi be the upper bound of the minimum privacy guarantee of data provider DPi . We define the Risk
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EXPERIMENTAL RESULT

Twelve UCI machine learning datasets are used in the experiments. Each dataset is split into several randomly sized sub-datasets,
simulating the distributed datasets from the data providers.
Characteristics of SAP First of all, we study the relationship
between the factors: k, the number of parties, bi , the upper bound

0

Figure 3: Some sample optiFigure 4: # of parties, optimalmality rates max{ρi /bi }
ity rate, and satisfaction level.
Effect on Model Accuracy We finalize the experiments with the
study of model accuracy for two representative classifiers: KNN
classifier and SVM classifier with RBF kernel. Certainly, geometric
perturbation can be applied to much more classifiers as discussed
in previous work [1]. We also study the effect of “partition distribution” to the model accuracy. A local dataset is treated as a sample of
the pooled dataset. Uniform partition distribution means the local
datasets are almost uniform sample sets of the pooled dataset, while
any skewed partition distribution does not have such property. The
numbers in Figure 5 and 6 show the deviation from the standard
accuracy which is generated on the original unperturbed dataset. A
negative number means that the actual accuracy is reduced.
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This equation consists of three components. We define the first
component Rt Ri−1 as the rotation adaptor Rit . Rt Ri−1 Ψi is still a
translation matrix, and thus we name the second part Ψt −Rt Ri−1 Ψi
as the the translation adaptor Ψit . The third part involves the
original noise component and we name ∆it = Rt Ri−1 ∆i as the
complementary noise. It is easy to prove that removing the complementary noise component in the target space Gt is equivalent
to inheriting the noise component ∆i from the original space Gi .
Therefore, we use < Rit , Ψit > as the space adaptor.
The protocol starts with the random selection of target perturbation, say, Gt : (Rt , tt ). Let each data provider, DPi , also have a
locally optimized perturbation Gi : (Ri , ti ). DPi provides only
the locally optimally perturbed dataset Gi (Xi ) to other parties.
Next, the coordinator, without loss of generality, DPk , generates
a sequence, which is a random permutation of the k data providers:
(1, . . . , k) ← (τ (1), . . . , τ (k)). Let DPi receive data from DPτ (i) .
However, we do not allow the coordinator to receive any dataset,
since the coordinator will also receive parameters later, which will
help to recover any received perturbation. Therefore, we randomly
redirect τ (k) to any j, j ∈ 1 . . . k−1, instead. Finally, the mapping
becomes (1, . . . , k − 1, j) ← (τ (1), . . . , τ (k)) j 6= k. Now, each
1
dataset Gi (Xi ) has a probability of k−1
going to any of the k − 1
data providers. After random exchange, each data provider sends
the received dataset to the data miner. By doing this, the identifiability of data source in the service provider’s view is reduced to
1
πi = k−1
.
Finally, each data provider DPi sends the space adaptor Ait =<
Rit , Ψit > to the coordinator. The coordinator maps the adaptors
to the right target by the permutation sequence, (DP1 : Aτ (1),t ,
. . . , DPj : Aτ (j),t , DPj : Aτ (k),t , . . . , DPk−1 :Aτ (k−1),t ), and
sends this sequence of space adaptors to the data miner.
Let the unified perturbation Gt gives satisfaction level si to DPi .
Therefore, the overall risk of privacy breach for DPi , from the view
of both data providers and the data miner, is:
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SPACE ADAPTATION PROTOCOL

Space adaptation protocol utilizes the concept of space adaptation to support de-identification of data sources. The basic idea
of reducing the identifiability of data sources is to make use of secure random exchange of perturbed datasets between data providers
with the help of space adaptation.
Let the perturbation parameters for the data provider DPi are
Gi : (Ri , ti ), with a common noise component ∆ used by all parties. Let the original sub-dataset be Xi and Yi be the perturbed
data. Now, suppose that we want to transform Yi to Yi→t in the target space Gt : (Rt , tt ) that has no noise component. The following
procedure is applied. Since Yi = Gi (Xi ) = Ri Xi + Ψi + ∆i , and
thus Xi = Ri−1 (Yi − Ψi − ∆i ), we can easily prove the following
equation hold:
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3.

(bi − si ρi )
ρi
= πi (1 − si · )
bi
bi

Minimum # of
Parties

RG
i = πi ·

of possible privacy guarantee for DPi , ρi , the locally optimized
privacy guarantee, and s0i : the satisfaction level that each party
expects. The rate ρbii is approximated by the optimality rate ρ̄b̂ i ,
i
which can be estimated on sample local optimization results. In
experiments, we use the algorithm and attack models discussed in
the paper [2] to study the factor ρ̄b̂i . Figure 3 shows the estimated
i
rates for the three typical datasets in 100 rounds. We choose the
maximum value in the series of experiments for each dataset as the
upper bound. Figure 4 shows the relationship between k, s0i and
the optimality rate.

Optimality Rate

of Privacy Breach for DPi , denoted by RG
i , as follows:
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Figure 5: The average devi- Figure 6: The average deviation of model accuracy for ation of model accuracy for
SVM(RBF) classifier.
KNN classifier.

5.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we proposed the space adaptation protocol to securely unify multiple geometric perturbations, analyzed the features of the protocol, and studied the relationship between the main
factors and tradeoffs theoretically and empirically.
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